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This paper motivates an account of knowledge as a social kind, following a cue by Edward 
Craig, which captures two major insights behind social and feminist epistemologies, in particu-
lar our epistemic interdependence concerning knowledge and the role of social regulative prac-
tices in understanding knowledge. This view, which falls within a truly social regulative epis-
temology (i.e. an epistemology which aims to guide our epistemic conduct and which renders 
our epistemic reliance on others ubiquitous), does not succumb to epistemic relativism and can 
accommodate other “traditional” tenets that render it anyway “real epistemology” (given Alvin 
Goldman’s chara erization). 
The paper proceeds as follows. The first section, “Varieties of epistemology”, introduces the 
two insights related to social and feminist epistemologies and motivates an anti-individualist ap-
proach to epistemology and the regulative project in epistemology. The second section, “Testi-
monial pra ice and knowledge”, presents the two key components of the Craigian framework 
and develops a novel pra ical explication of the concept of knowledge related to the testimonial 
pra ice from which a particular account of knowledge as a social kind is derived. The third 
section, “Some advantages of the account”, concludes by pointing out some advantages of the 
resulting account of knowledge. 
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ABSTRACT
This paper motivates an account of knowledge as a social kind, following a cue by Edward 
Craig, which captures two major insights behind social and feminist epistemologies, in par-
ticular our epistemic interdependence concerning knowledge and the role of social regula-
tive practices in understanding knowledge. 
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RESUMO
Este artigo motiva um relato do conhecimento como um tipo social, seguindo uma suges-
tão de Edward Craig, que capta dois grandes pontos de vista das epistemologias sociais e 
feministas, em particular a nossa interdependência epistêmica em relação ao conhecimento 
e o papel das práticas reguladoras sociais na compreensão do conhecimento.
Palavras-chave: anti-individualismo epistemológico, epistemologia reguladora, explicação 
prática, testemunho.
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Varieties of epistemology 
Some believe that we have come to the end of episte-
mology. They deny that knowledge is an appropriate object 
of philosophical enquiry. This idea can be found in French 
philosophers, such as Jean-François Lyotard (1984), An-
glo-American ones, such as Richard Rorty (1979), and other 
postmodernists. Although epistemology was once at the cen-
tre of philosophy (in particular, during the Modern period, 
which can be most clearly appreciated in the work of Des-
cartes), now it is sugge ed it should be put aside and rejected. 
But, of course, not everyone thinks that epistemology is dead, 
although some, such as social and feminist epistemologists, 
think that epistemology needs changes. What these social and 
feminist epistemologists criticize is some “old ways” of tradi-
tional epistemology (as conceived by analytical philosophers) 
but, pace Rorty and company, they also develop new epis-
temic alternatives.3 Consider, for instance, Alvin Goldman’s 
(2010, p. 2) chara erization of traditional epistemology by 
means of some central tenets that it holds:4
(a) the epistemic agents are individuals;
(b)  the focus is on the study of epistemic evaluation or 
normativity;
(c)  the normative standards aren’t merely conventional 
or relativistic but have some sort of objective validity;
(d)  the central notions of epistemic attainment either 
entail or are closely linked to truth;
(e)  truth is an objective, largely mind-independent, af-
fair;
(f)  the central business of traditional epistemology is 
the critical examination of doxastic decision-mak-
ing: adopting, retaining or revising one’s beliefs and 
other doxastic attitudes. 
Many social and feminist epistemologists reject one or 
more of these tenets. The more they reject, the more revision-
ist they are, up to the point of not being “real epistemology” 
anymore.5 But here I’m intere ed in one central commitment 
of much epistemology which is in fact absent from this list, 
which is very much part of the tradition and which most so-
cial and feminist epistemologists reject. In fact, its absence 
from (A-F) suggests how deeply ingrained the commitment 
can be even for the “godfather” of social epistemology. 
Epistemic anti-individualism
This commitment, present in traditional accounts of 
knowledge, which social and feminist epistemologists often 
reject, is epistemic individualism. This is the view that, roughly, 
no knowledge-relevant normative status depends on factors 
that lie outside the cognitive agency of the knower. Although 
there is somehow a trend in mainstream analytic epistemolo-
gy toward an appreciation of the “social chara er” of knowl-
edge, it is correct to say that individualism in epistemology 
still has paradigmatic status. This focus on the individual 
knower is the legacy of the Cartesian tradition in epistemol-
ogy. At least since Descartes, the focus on epistemology (in 
part of the We ern tradition) has been very much on the 
individual. Descartes takes individual cognitive autonomy 
as a fundamental epistemic value and stresses that achieving 
knowledge is an individual feat. 
This can be seen as a rea ion to the intellectual crisis of 
his times. Given the fall of the Textual Tradition in the 16th 
century and of Aristotelian Science in the 17th century, many 
thinkers of this period were particularly wary of the testimo-
nial pra ice. So, for example, Francis Bacon clearly rejects the 
authority of past thinkers. And he wasn’t alone in not sharing 
a reverence for the past. The Royal Society of London for the 
Improving of Natural Knowledge, whose motto was Nulli-
us in Verba, was one of many parallel institutions in Europe 
that shared this anti-scholasticism and anti-traditionalism. 
Indeed, Descartes tells us, in the Discourse, that he found him-
3 So they do not merely encourage us to abandon some (but not all) key epistemic tenets or projects, they also put forward alternative 
epistemic ones to replace them. Of course, there are feminist and social philosophers who are influenced by post-modernism (e.g. Flax, 
1993). Those thinkers are also “negative,” in the sense that they encourage us to abandon every epistemological project. In fact, given 
there are a variety of feminist approaches (Anderson, 2015), it seems misleading to talk about “feminist epistemology” as if there were 
one such epistemology (as if there were one approach or set of tenets under which all these feminist views fall). To be clear, I will be 
using the phrase “feminist epistemology” to pick out those feminist epistemologies that are critical of presuppositions of mainstream 
analytical epistemology but are not “negative” (a la Rorty). So I also speak of “feminist epistemologists” given that commonality. These 
epistemologists distance themselves from the tradition, but also claim that their work ought to be recognized as being concerned with 
“many of the problems that have vexed traditional epistemology” (Potter and Alcoff, 1993, p. 1). Similarly, “social epistemology” is used 
to pick out “positive” social epistemologies.
4 Of course, there are other ways of characterizing what traditional epistemology is: say, by means of projects or topics, as opposed to 
tenets. These other characterizations are not likely to be co-extensive with Goldman’s preferred characterization. Anyhow, for present 
purposes, this needn’t concern us (as it’ll become clear below—see also fn.3).
5 Goldman (2010) tries to make sense of Alston’s remarks that Goldman (1999) “would be rejected by many contemporary epistemolo-
gists as ‘not real epistemology’” (2005, p. 5) and so suggests that the more revisionist approaches (as opposed to preservationist and 
expansionist approaches, which are more continuous with the tradition) are not “real epistemology.” So a work such as Fuller (1988) 
might not count as real epistemology for being too revisionist. Such a view must be controversial since it is very much debatable whether 
continuity with traditional epistemology, understood as a set of tenets, is the way to understand what counts as real epistemology and 
how much discontinuity renders an approach non-epistemological. But, for present purposes, this debate is not relevant since Gold-
man’s characterization seems to be the most stringent and I will offer an account of knowledge that respects most of the (A-F) tenets 
while rendering knowledge anyway a social kind.
Leandro De Brasi
Filosofi a Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy – 18(3): 130-139, sep/dec 2017 132
self forced to become his own guide, emerging from the con-
trol of his teachers and texts and resolving to seek “the true 
method of attaining the knowledge of everything within my 
mental capabilities” (AT VI 17; also AT VI 9). 
For Descartes, it is only one’s own epistemic achieve-
ment that can render some belief knowledge, and only for 
oneself: knowledge is a personal feat.6 The Cartesian ideal of 
epistemic autonomy (metaphorically, that the individual epis-
temic agent ought to stand on her own epistemic feet7) that 
lies behind this picture is what seems to motivate the individ-
ualism adopted by the tradition. Descartes sets forth the view 
that knowledge can be achieved only if one is not influenced 
by traditions or the community. Knowledge requires autono-
my as absence of external interference. And traditional ana-
lytical epistemology remains since then firmly individualistic 
(in this Cartesian way8). 
But one overlap between (much) social and feminist 
epistemologists is their emphasis on the importance of the 
social/communal a ects of knowledge-yielding pra ices, 
contra Descartes. For them, a solipsistic knower is implau-
sible: there is no viable “Robinson Crusoe” conception of 
knowledge.9 The main focus of dissatisfa ion with tradition-
al epistemology derives from its neglect of our epistemic in-
terdependence. Taking this dependence seriously is not just 
a matter of expanding our testimonial dependence, it also 
means recognizing the more complex pra ices of interde-
pendence found in our division of epistemic labour that are 
not reducible to transmitting knowledge. It is a mistake to 
take information sharing as exhausting the forms of epistemic 
dependence to which our beliefs are subjected (e.g. Goldberg, 
2011; Pritchard, 2015; Townley, 2011). In fact, in epistemic 
communities, members not only share information, but also 
act as exemplars, co-operators and trainers, among other 
things. Some are exemplars and mentors for me as a know-
er; some enable me to fine-tune and improve my epistemic 
standards and pra ices. We depend on others in order to 
calibrate our own standards and we assist others (directly or 
indirectly) to maintain appropriate standards. 
So our epistemic reliance on others needn’t be limited 
to instances in which one exploits an inter-personal knowl-
edge-yielding procedure, such as testimony.10 It can be, and it 
is (e.g. De Brasi, 2015a; Simon, 2015), much more pervasive. 
For example, although the knower needn’t possess the posi-
tive grounds for the endorsement of the procedures that she 
and other members of the community rely on, someone does 
(in the sense that some subject or, more likely, a group of sub-
jects of the knower’s epistemic community have undertaken, 
over time, the positive epistemic work for the endorsement of 
the community’s e ablished procedures (De Brasi, 2015a).11 
Indeed, there is some sort of epistemic policing that prompts 
the correction or perfection of suboptimal knowledge-yield-
ing procedures (e.g. Bruner, 2013; Goldman, 2011). 
This sort of epistemic interdependence entails epistemic 
anti-individualism, which is the claim that the (positive) epis-
temic standing of a belief depends epistemically on properties 
and a ions other than the knower’s (cf. Carter and Palermos, 
2015; Pritchard, 2015). So, as social and feminist epistemol-
ogists have for some time noticed (e.g. Potter and Alcoff, 
1993; Schmitt, 1994), traditional individualist positions seem 
doomed. Indeed, this anti-individualist approach, by empha-
sizing the cooperative and intera ive a ects of knowing, 
corrects the unfortunate individualist simplifications of much 
current mainstream epistemology, which are unsuitable for 
theorizing about knowers who are members of social com-
munities and so seem to be stopping us from making progress 
(Fricker, 2010; Goldberg, 2010; De Brasi, 2015b). 
6 Different readings can be favoured. One might favour a weak reading that only requires that knowledge is primarily a personal feat. 
A strong positive reading requires the pursuing of knowledge to be carried out in a solitary way, without the aid of others, and so knowl-
edge becomes an exclusively personal feat. A negative version of the strong reading states that the individual epistemic agent does not 
require interaction with others in order to acquire knowledge (cf. Antony, 1995). This negative thesis can in turn be given a strong and a 
weak reading. The strong negative thesis claims that the individual epistemic agent does not in fact require such interaction. The weak 
negative thesis claims that the individual epistemic agent does not in principle require such interaction. It is clear that Descartes in some 
moods has the strong positive reading in mind (cf. Locke, 1975, Essay, I.iv.23).
7 Better put, a given belief can only have a positive epistemic status for its possessor if such status is achieved through the possessor’s 
epistemic capacities (e.g. perception, memory and reason).
8 In the sense of “the attainment of knowledge as a project for each individual on her or his own” (Jaggar, 1983, p. 355).
9 Relying on others seems to be cognitively fundamental for beings like us (Burge, 1993—more on the section “Testimonial practice and 
knowledge”). So any investigation into human knowledge should be at odds with this Cartesian ideal and its accompanying individualist 
framework. As Jonathan Kvanvig says, “[…] we should never begin to think that the deepest epistemological questions concern the 
isolated intellect” (1992, p. 177). That’s because “[…] one is reminded here of the attempt to do ethics by beginning with ‘desert island’ 
cases; even if such cases are possible, it is absurd to think that we can come to be enlightened about the nature of the moral life we 
share by focusing on such cases. Just so in the epistemological case” (1992, p. 178). See also Welbourne (1986, p. 83).
10 Testimony has rightly received copious attention recently—e.g. Lackey and Sosa (2006)—but it is not the most epistemically interest-
ing social phenomenon; see below.
11 Knowledge needn’t be a reflective success of the knower. Although responsiveness to the world is required for knowledge, respon-
siveness to reasons does not seem to be (e.g. Ayer, 1972; Lewis, 1996; Millar, 2010—not even reasons concerning the procedures 
exploited; cf. Bonjour, 1985). Much of our responsiveness to the world is achieved without responsiveness to reasons. Indeed, the fact 
that “knowledge attributions can be underwritten by a believer’s reliability, even when the believer is not in a position to offer reasons 
for the belief” can be seen as “the Founding Insight of reliabilism” (Brandom, 2000, p. 99). This is an “insight” because, regardless of 
one’s sympathies, no such reflective responsiveness seems required of the knower herself.
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Regulative epistemology
However, one overlap between these feminist and social 
epistemologists, on the one hand, and Descartes, on the other, 
is their commitment to the regulative epistemic project which 
aims to determine appropriate ways of obtaining knowledge 
(and other epistemic goods) and which mainstream episte-
mology hasn’t pursued. This regulative project, as Stephen 
Stich says, “tries to say which ways of going about the quest 
for knowledge [...] are the good ones” (1990, p. 1). So, when 
engaged in this project, we try to determine legitimate ways 
of obtaining knowledge. And many historical figures, such as 
Bacon in Novum Organum, Descartes in the Rules for the Direc-
tion of the Mind and Locke in Of the Conduct of the Understand-
ing, among others, have pursued it. Moreover, Stich correctly 
says that “those who work in this branch of epistemology are 
motivated, at least in part, by very pra ical concerns” (1990, 
p. 2). This is clearly exemplified in the case of the aforemen-
tioned philosophers, who, responding to the intellectual crisis 
of their time, propose reforms to people’s epistemic conduct 
by providing knowledge-yielding procedures.12 So there is 
clearly a pra ical orientation within the regulative project. 
Indeed, as Robert Roberts and Jay Woods say: “Regulative 
epistemology is a response to perceived deficiencies in peo-
ple’s epistemic conduct, and thus is strongly pra ical and so-
cial [...]. This kind of epistemology aims to change the (social) 
world” (2007, p. 21). 
For example, when feminist philosophers turned their 
attention to the field of epistemology, in the early 1980s, 
it did not take long for them to realize that the standardly 
available epistemological analyses were ill-quipped to handle 
their feminist concerns. This was in part because mainstream 
analyses were simply irrelevant to assessing biases found in 
the messy social world of knowledge pra ices.13 But feminist 
epistemologists believe that our knowledge-yielding pra ices 
can be changed and improved: they can be transformed (by 
responsible epistemic agents) into pra ices that do a better 
job at achieving our epistemic aims (the same can be said 
about social epistemology; see e.g. Goldman, 1999).14
This transformative potential of feminist epistemology, 
concerning the actual social pra ices of knowing, is in line 
with the regulative project. It considers how pra ices can be 
improved upon and whether they should be maintained or 
abandoned. Still, feminist epistemologists who attend to our 
social pra ices of knowing are sometimes criticized for being 
engaged with no more than description, or in “mere sociolo-
gy”. As Rooney (2011) tells us, feminist epistemology is not 
normally thought to be epistemology “proper” by mainstream 
epistemologists (see also Potter and Alcoff, 1993, p. 1). At best 
when feminist epistemology is given some acknowledgement 
in mainstream epistemology, it’s recognized as epistemology 
but only in a restricted sense, as a form of applied epistemol-
ogy, as if it were a bad thing15 (for example, something that 
might be applicable in contexts where gender roles or pra ic-
es are epistemically significant). 
But this either misses the concern of feminist epistemol-
ogy in evaluating, rather than simply describing, pra ices 
or misses the emphasis of feminist epistemology on situated 
knowers (i.e. knowers that aren’t stripped of their  ecificity 
deriving from social and cultural location). For feminist epis-
temologists, knowledge is in a way the product of social prac-
tices and so knowledge emerges as a socially located phenom-
enon.16 The notion of a “standard knower”, undifferentiated 
from any other knowers, is not viable.17 Not only is the social 
location of the knower relevant to epistemic evaluation, but 
also the actual social pra ices can determine what is knowl-
edge.18 For feminist epistemologists, to equate the realm of the 
epistemically normative with idealized epistemology is a mis-
take. And missing this point can cause the disregard for actual 
social pra ices in the study of the nature of knowledge and so 
devaluing the theorizing of feminists. 
Mainstream epistemology is not concerned with the 
norms and methods embedded in the pra ices for achieving 
knowledge in a given context, whereas feminist epistemolo-
12 They actively engage in the project to remedy the deficiencies of our epistemic practices (say, to increase their truth-conduciveness). 
So, Bacon famously draws our attention to the biases that stand in the way of acquiring knowledge, giving us a four-fold classification 
of these obstacles, “Idols”, in Novum Organum and providing us with procedures that counteract these bad intellectual habits and ten-
dencies. Similarly, Descartes in the Rules provides us with a set of rules to guide us in the acquisition of scientia and to avoid praejudicia 
(see also Discourse, AT VI 17-9). And, Locke in Of the Conduct is interested in correcting our epistemic conduct to achieve knowledge 
by developing good intellectual habits through training.
13 Another reason was of course they were completely wrongheaded in their abstraction: as seen, by being removed from their social 
environment.
14 In fact, Goldman (2011) characterizes a whole branch of social epistemology, systems-oriented social epistemology, as being con-
cerned with this.
15 Some take applied epistemology to be “a departure from the central issues taken up in epistemology” (Feldman, 1999, p. 172). And 
in many books about the present and future state of epistemology (e.g. Hetherington, 2006; Hendricks and Pritchard, 2008; Steup et 
al., 2014) feminist epistemology does not make an appearance.
16 For example, Nelson (1993) argues that individuals could not know if they were not members of a community. And Heckman (1990) 
argues that the theory of knowledge studies a system of rules that is contextual and historical. Both agree that the empirical study of 
communities’ practices is vital for epistemology. 
17 The contrast with mainstream analytic theories of knowledge could not be starker.
18 Compare, for instance, Stroud’s complaint that we “cannot conclude simply from our having carefully and conscientiously followed the 
standards and procedures of everyday life that we thereby know the things we ordinarily claim to know” (1984, p. 69).
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gies are “liberatory”, in the sense that they attempt to improve 
actual knowledge-yielding pra ices.19 This attempt goes 
hand in hand with formulating epistemologies that help to 
guide our intellectual enquiries adequately. But mainstream 
analytic theory of knowledge has very little to say about it 
and this narrow focus of mainstream epistemology marks a 
radical departure from Descartes’s (and others’) concern with 
the methods and rules of enquiry. And insofar as feminist 
and social epistemologists discuss questions of methodolo-
gy, it appears more correct to see their epistemologies, rather 
than mainstream epistemology, as continuous with the tradi-
tion with regard to this regulative a ect. In fact, mainstream 
epistemology seems irrelevant to many because it does not 
even attempt to be a guide for our intellectual endeavours. 
As David Kaplan says, an epistemic theory “deprived of any 
role in methodology or the conduct of inquiry and criticism 
is a theory that divorces epistemology from the very pra ices 
that furnish it with its only source of intuitive constraint. It is 
epistemology on holiday” (1991, p. 154). 
Regulative epistemology is strongly pra ical since it 
aims to provide us with adequate regulatory procedures that 
guide our epistemic conduct. But feminist and social epis-
temologists, pace Descartes and mainstream contemporary 
epistemology, want to emphasise as well the importance of 
the social/communal a ects of knowledge-yielding pra ic-
es and so reject the individualism promoted by the Cartesian 
ideal of autonomy. So the recent regulative and anti-individ-
ualist turns in analytic epistemology, exemplified by these 
feminist and social epistemologies, can be seen as responding 
to the acceptance of a traditional goal to ameliorate our epis-
temic pra ices and the rejection of the above Cartesian ideal. 
In other words, changes that have been taking place since the 
latter part of the 20th century in the epistemological landscape 
can be understood as the result of the rejection of a Cartesian 
thesis, doomed by our increasingly clearer awareness of our 
epistemic interdependence, and the acceptance of a Cartesian 
goal, more in line with our pra ical interests. 
Testimonial practice 
and knowledge
Having introduced the two major insights (and related 
theses) of social and feminist epistemologies, I will now de-
velop an account of knowledge as a social kind that can cap-
ture and explain these insights, inspired by the work of Craig 
(1990). To do this, let me present the two key components of 
the Craigian framework and develop a novel pra ical expli-
cation of the concept of knowledge related to the testimonial 
pra ice from which a particular account of knowledge as a 
social kind is derived. 
Craig (1990), disenchanted with the state of much 
post-Gettier mainstream epistemology, sugge ed a meth-
odological innovation and a methodological presupposition 
to investigate knowledge, as well as giving up two pretensions 
of the time, namely: the standard post-Gettier methodology 
(that exploits only intuitions about particular cases, which 
can deliver fatal blows to analyses) and the accompanying 
analyses (which are taken to provide individually necessary 
and jointly sufficient conditions for knowledge). However, 
before getting into all of this, it is important to consider the 
nature of the testimonial pra ice, since the purpose of the 
concept of knowledge depends on a conceptual need gener-
ated by this pra ice. 
Testimonial practice
Our testimonial pra ice seems to serve the human need 
for truth (e.g. Craig, 1990; Williams, 2002). It seems that the 
goal of our testimonial pra ice is to satisfy our fundamental 
need for truth: a universal and inescapable need that is under-
stood as being a part of our nature (e.g. Dretske, 1989, p. 89). 
This need for truth requires as a matter of natural necessity 
to be satisfied. Moreover, there is no denying that we are in-
herently social creatures that depend on each other (includ-
ing, as seen, epistemically) and many, throughout the times, 
have noticed it (e.g. Aristotle, Politics 1253a2; Tuomela, 2007, 
p. 149ff). We live in social groups in which we form strong 
relationships and coalitions and, importantly, cooperate with 
each other (Bowles and Gintis, 2011). Indeed, since splitting 
from the chimpanzees, we have undergone rapid evolution of 
the body (and particularly the brain), developing remarkable 
intelligence, cultural capacities and pro-social capabilities 
that have enabled us to live in norm-governed ways in larger 
and larger groups.20 
So the idea is that, in a socially interdependent life-
style, the other members of the community can be sources of 
truths, which would be particularly beneficial for one in those 
19 Work on epistemic injustice demonstrates how feminist and social epistemology can be performed in the service of quite explicit 
liberatory enterprises (e.g. Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013). Some of these transformative projects address issues of race, sexuality, class, 
etc., and not just gender.
20 On our capacity for regulation of ourselves and others by social norms, see e.g. Sripada and Stich (2007); Chudeck and Henrich (2011). 
Some have suggested that as human groups became larger, a shift had to occur from cooperative mechanisms that relied on altruistic 
sentiments (sympathy, compassion, etc.) to those that relied on a “norm psychology” that applied more abstract norms that did not 
depend on those sentiments (e.g. Boehm, 2012; Kitcher, 2011). So it is not surprising to find humans to have an other-things-equal 
disposition to acquire and conform to local norms. Indeed, on the issue of acquisition of normative structures to regulate behaviour, 
see also Andrews (2015); Zawidzki (2013). Here, I will be taking practices as being norm-governed. Also, norms (or the procedures on 
which they are instantiated) needn’t be different from (cognitive) habits (derived from socially-shaped practices) and habits certainly 
play a role in our conduct.
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cases in which they enjoy some “positional advantage” and/
or expertise which one does not.21 That is, given our nature, 
our need for truth can be more effectively addressed by the 
pooling of truths within the community (that is, by the gath-
ering of truths from others), as well as using our “on-board” 
capacities, such as perception and reason (Craig, 1990, p. 11). 
So, given our testimonial pra ice is in place to address 
our need for truth, for this pra ice to be successful, it ought to 
be instrumentally adequate: i.e., promote the truth. But, since 
we do not always cooperate and are not always competent, if 
we are to bracket the myriad differences between particular 
people (in large communities) and render a pra ice that aims 
to satisfy a fundamental need safer, we must regulate this 
pooling of information. Cooperating with those who share 
the same norms as you do would be not just safer but also 
more efficient than cooperating with out-group members. 
This is a solution that seems to be employed in social life: the 
existence of norms and roles that limit the space of interac-
tions with others, providing us with forms of norm-governed 
intera ions that obtain even with strangers (see fn. 20). 
The details of this regulation depend, of course, on 
the nature and circumstances of the community (say, when 
people tend to lie and what subject-matters they tend to be 
inaccurate about and how). That is, the particular regula-
tory procedures adopted vary depending on  ecific details 
surrounding the community. But we can distinguish three 
testimonial virtues under which the different regulatory pro-
cedures fall: the virtues of Competence and Sincerity of the 
 eaker and the virtue of Acceptance of the hearer.22 So felici-
tous testimonial exchanges are cases in which all three virtues 
are relevantly instantiated, where each of them picks out a set 
of truth-conducive procedures that address one of the three 
different acts in any such exchange: namely, the attainment of 
the information, its communication and its acceptance.
The two testimonial virtues of the  eaker are con-
cerned with the acquisition of the truth and the non-mislead-
ing communication of it. These two  eaker-centred virtues 
regulate against, crudely put, the “honest fool” and “able liar” 
scenarios. Here, for reasons that will become clear, I focus on 
Competence. This virtue regulates the relationship between 
the  eaker and the information that p to be (potentially) 
shared and it consists in a series of “methods of inquiry:” 
procedures that are concerned with the acquisition of the 
truth (Williams, 2002, p. 127). These procedures concern the 
methods of investigation that the  eaker employs to access 
the truth, which is what the pra ice aims to transmit. Con-
sider, for example, the visual identification of objects. Here we 
are meant to take into account the lighting conditions, shad-
ows, degrees of occlusion, distance to the object, duration of 
experience, training in such identification and general cogni-
tive health, among other things. That is, there are conditions 
under which the identification of an object is reasonably tak-
en to be non-truth-conducive and the different procedures 
guide us as to when we can and cannot testify given certain 
circumstances. This virtue then helps us avoid acquiring 
falsehoods (and consequently transmitting them if Sincere). 
Legal, scientific and historiographic pra ices, among 
others, are areas with highly defined procedures (and expec-
tations upon pra itioners). In these cases, it is clear that we 
are exploiting a formal set of procedures. Institutions fix ex-
plicit norms governing the possible epistemic behaviours of 
their members. But, as sugge ed, we also cultivate sensitivi-
ties to different everyday procedures that we apply in order 
to promote the truth when inquiring as to whether p. And 
most everyday Competence procedures should probably be 
understood as being cognitive habits that we acquire through 
implicit social training (which can then help us make sense 
of the fact that we find it difficult to articulate them23). For 
space’s sake, I cannot say much about the nature of the tes-
timonial procedures here. But notice that, given their regu-
latory function within this pra ice that we foster, these are 
endorsed procedures that guide us in the acquisition of truths. 
So legitimate procedures will not only have to be de facto 
truth-conducive (given the pra ice’s goal), but also reason-
ably taken to be truth-conducive by the epistemic communi-
ty (that aims to regulate the pra ice). 
Now, while some procedures are regulative of the prac-
tice, others are constitutive. Say, in the case of games, the con-
stitutive rules are the rules which define the game and so are 
“intimately connected” to it (Williamson, 2000, p. 239). One 
cannot play the game without following those rules. But that 
is not so in the case of the regulative rules, since they “assess 
different ways of playing the game: they  ecify what it is to 
play the game well, but presuppose that there is something 
that counts as playing the game in the first place” (Maitra, 
2011, p. 280). Given this, our procedures are not constitutive 
of the testimonial pra ice. Indeed, we can engage in testimo-
nial exchanges badly: non-felicitous testimonial exchanges 
are still testimonial exchanges (nevertheless, as its pra i-
tioner, one is expected to follow these regulative procedures). 
Practical explication
Against this background, let’s introduce the method-
ological innovation of the Craigian framework, which is the 
use of a “pra ical explication” to help us make sense of fea-
tures of the target phenomenon (Craig, 1990, p. 8; see also 
Butchvarov, 1970). Craig holds that we should ask “what the 
concept of knowledge does for us, what its role in our life 
might be, and then ask what a concept having that role would 
21 One enjoys a “positional advantage” when one is better positioned, spatially and/or temporally, to find out whether p (Williams, 2002, 
p. 42).
22 Williams (2002, p. 44) refers to Competence as “Accuracy” and, following him, I capitalize these terms to show they are terms of art.
23 Just like in the case of language (a rule-governed activity), we cannot easily articulate its rules (whether they are innate or acquired).
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be like” (1990, p. 2). According to Craig, this functional role, 
for epistemically interdependent social beings like ourselves, 
is to flag good informants (1990, p. 11; see also Williams, 
1973). Roughly, Craig’s story begins with the need for the 
concept of a good informant in a primitive state of human-
kind and attempts to show how such concept, through a pro-
cess of “objectivisation”, becomes our concept of knowledge. 
But many other suggestions have been made about other (re-
lated) roles (e.g. understood in terms of signalling out targets 
for blame—Beebe, 2012, terminating inquiry—Kappel, 2010, 
and encouraging good testimony—Reynolds, 2002). 
The plausible hypothesis here explored is that the con-
cept of knowledge picks out cases where the testimonial 
procedures of Competence are successful. So I implement 
the Craigian framework with a different hypothesis that is 
not susceptible to worries raised about Craig’s own (Gelfert, 
2011; Kelp, 2011) by doing without an imaginary state-of-
nature genealogy and the need for an objectivisation of the 
concept. This seems in fact independently desirable since it is 
hard to assess the plausibility of state-of-nature and develop-
mental stories about concepts, neither of which is anyway re-
quired for a pra ical explication (Kappel, 2010). The offered 
hypothesis about the role of the concept of knowledge, just 
like Craig’s own, might be rejected if not considered plausible. 
But, if plausible, the hypothesis should be judged ultimately 
on its theoretical fruits. 
The starting point is the thesis that the concept of 
knowledge is required to satisfy a certain need of ours. Of 
course, once we have the concept of knowledge, we might 
use it in a variety of different ways. But the idea is that there 
is a particular need that the concept is meant to satisfy that 
provides it with its point, which in turn helps us make sense 
of features of the target phenomenon (Kappel, 2010). And 
the suggestion is that this need arises out of the development 
of our fundamental and pervasive testimonial pra ice. More 
precisely, the concept of knowledge is the result of a concep-
tual need related to this pra ice. 
To see this, we need to think of the possibility of failure 
and success in testimony. From the  eaker’s side, she can fail 
to engage in felicitous testimony by either not being Sincere 
or Competent (or both). But, in felicitous cases, neither being 
Sincere nor Competent entails that what is being told (p) is 
true. More particularly, Competent performance does not 
pick out only those cases in which one achieves the truth. Af-
ter all, most testimonial procedures we exploit to work out 
whether p are not likely to be perfectly truth-conducive given a 
reasonable feasibility constraint (otherwise the pra ice would 
become useless). So Competence procedures are not fa ive. 
Nevertheless, if one Competently and Sincerely testifies 
that p, then even if p is not the case, one is not to blame for 
such unsuccessful testimony. But blameless testimony is not 
the aim of the pra ice. The pra ice is designed to deliver 
truth, and without it, the testimony, even if blameless, does 
not satisfy the pra ice’s goal. Successful testimony requires 
truth. So, given we want to be able to refer to those cases in 
which we do achieve the truth (i.e., those cases in which the 
Competence procedure exploited is successful), we seem to 
need a new concept. This concept picks out those cases of 
Competence that succeed in achieving the truth and the sug-
gestion is that such concept is knowledge. The basic idea, on 
which this hypothesis rests, is that the verb ‘know’ is what 
Gilbert Ryle calls an “achievement word” (1949, p. 143), as op-
posed to a task word (compare scoring to shooting). ‘Know’ is 
a “verb of success” (1949, p. 125), which indicates the success-
ful accomplishment of a task. The suggestion is that ‘know’ is 
a verb that indicates success with regard to the Competence 
task. In other words, ‘know’ indicates the possession of the 
truth by means of Competence procedures. 
So the concept of knowledge addresses a particular con-
ceptual need generated by our universal and pervasive tes-
timonial pra ice. This need can provide us with a pra ical 
explication of the concept of knowledge that allows us to ex-
plain why the concept enjoys such widespread use (all known 
cultures engage in such a pra ice and have such a concept). 
And, to repeat, given that Competence does not entail truth, 
we need the concept of knowledge to pick out the successful 
cases of Competence. So some concepts are required in con-
nection with our testimonial pra ice, one of which is the suc-
cess-concept knowledge that picks out cases of Competence 
that deliver the truth. 
Now, it is important to note two things to appreciate the 
plausibility of the hypothesis. First, the concept of knowledge 
also applies to hearers who felicitously acquire the truth via 
testimony, since a competent way to acquire the truth (given 
the regulation of testimony and the usual scenario involving 
chains of testimony) is by means of testimony. This way of 
acquiring the truth renders it fit for further transmission by 
the hearer. So we can also talk of hearers as knowing when 
accepting testimony. Second, we can also refer to individu-
als who are not involved in a testimonial exchange as know-
ing. That is, potential testifiers as well as individuals who are 
not trusted or will not testify or deceive us can be thought as 
knowing. This is because, regardless of whether one transmits 
the truth and whether someone accepts it, if one Competent-
ly achieves it, one qualifies as knowing.24 
So the point of the concept of knowledge is to allow us 
to pick out the successful cases of Competence.25 Importantly, 
the account of knowledge we can derive from this pra ical 
explication has great explanatory power, a case that will be 
pointed out in the third section (“Some advantages of the ac-
24 For more on this and the different roles the concept can still fulfil, see De Brasi (2015b).
25 Of course I am not suggesting that this is the only plausible hypothesis available. We have mentioned others and they might be equal-
ly plausible for all I have said. But I’m not trying to argue against these candidates. The aim is to show that the proposed hypothesis has 
great theoretical fruits. It is a further issue whether the alternatives do so too.
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count”) by way of conclusion. But, first, let’s consider how this 
pra ical explication helps us understand what knowledge is.
Knowledge as a social kind
A second main component of the Craigian framework 
is that knowledge is a social kind: roughly, a category that 
human beings impose on the world (in response to central 
needs and interests). As Craig (1990, p. 3) says, knowledge 
is “something that we delineate by operating with a concept 
which we create in answer to certain needs”. Hilary Kornblith 
complains that Craig does not give us “a reason to believe that 
the category of knowledge is socially constructed rather than 
a natural kind” (2011, p. 49). But, firstly, it is not clear that 
knowledge could be regarded as a natural kind (Brown, 2012) 
and, secondly and more importantly, this is to be taken as a 
plausible methodological presupposition and the best way to 
proceed is to assume its correctness and see where it takes us 
(Craig, 1990, p. 4). After all, the most effective way to demon-
strate the limitations of any approach, including the natural 
kind one, is by developing a better alternative, and here I at-
tempt to contribute to the development of a Craig-inspired 
alternative. This approach should be judged ultimately on its 
theoretical fruits and I aim to indicate the great explanatory 
power it can enjoy. 
Social kinds are the causally significant human cate-
gories that, say, social pra ices can produce. They are cat-
egories, which we humans create in the transa ions that 
define social life, that pick out features of the world whose 
significance makes them candidates for inclusion in our best 
theories (in causally powerful explanations).26 And the exis-
tence or persistence or chara er of the category is caused or 
constituted by human mental states, decisions, culture or so-
cial pra ices. They often emerge from a concern with social 
regulation and given that they are products of sociocultural 
a ivity, they could in principle not exist or be changed. But 
such categories needn’t be unstable. In fact, we have seen how 
knowledge is a category that responds to natural universal in-
terests and needs, given our nature. This is not so arbitrary 
and contingent. In fact, as a matter of human natural necessi-
ty it is difficult to imagine the inexistence of the category and 
changes to its chara er (other than to particular procedures). 
Knowledge, at least, is a stable-enough social category: its 
particular social and natural setting is guarantee enough for 
the category to create a stable explanatorily-relevant property 
cluster kind that supports our epistemic projects over periods 
of time. Moreover, none of the above suggests that knowledge 
is not a natural phenomenon: our minds and our social prac-
tices are natural real things. Human pra ices can produce 
social natural reality. 
So, given the above, knowledge, although a natural phe-
nomenon, is the kind of phenomenon that we shape. So the 
suggestion, echoing Craig, is that the above success concept, 
which satisfies a  ecific conceptual need generated by our 
basic and universal testimonial pra ice, delineates the phe-
nomenon of knowledge. I suggest then that knowledge is 
the apprehension of the truth by means of truth-conducive 
procedures that are in place for Competence. So, to know is 
to grasp the truth by means of certain norms, where these 
constitutive norms of knowledge are certain procedures of 
testimony that are endorsed by our epistemic community.27 
And, to repeat, these procedures are legitimate only if they are 
de facto truth-conducive as well as endorsed.28 
Some advantages 
of the account
So, with this account of knowledge as a social kind at 
hand and by way of conclusion, we can consider some of its 
advantages.29 First, it allows us to make sense of the insights 
of social and feminist epistemologies pointed out above. 
It not only accommodates but also explains why regulative 
pra ices which guide our epistemic conduct and which are 
sensitive to social location have a legitimate role in the the-
ory of knowledge. Also, it accommodates and explains why 
our epistemic interdependence goes beyond testimony, given 
the endorsement involved in the regulation, and so explains 
the anti-individualism that goes with it. Second, it does this 
without succumbing to epistemic relativism. After all, none 
of the above suggests knowledge should be seen as a pure-
ly social product, unconstrained by any objective epistemic 
26 Kinds pick out those categories that are important enough to figure in our successful theories and, following Boyd (1992), are causally 
homeostatic property clusters. Causal homeostasis is understood as either “the presence of some properties […] tends [...] to favor the 
presence of others, or there are underlying mechanisms or processes that tend to maintain the presence of the properties [...] or both” 
(Boyd, 1999, p. 143).
27 The regulative testimonial procedures are constitutive of knowledge in the sense that without them there would be no knowledge.
28 Of course it is important to consider in some more detail the nature of the testimonial practice, and particularly the nature of its 
regulatory procedures, if we are to better understand what knowledge is. But, for space’s sake, that is not something we can do here. 
Anyhow, see De Brasi (2015a) for some independent motivation for the sort of account of knowledge developed and some refinements 
that should be added to it as well as responses to some possible objections.
29 For other advantages, see e.g. De Brasi (forthcoming), that shows how it allows epistemic intuitions to play a legitimate (but not 
fundamental) role in theorizing (compare a natural kind approach), but also notice that this property cluster approach explains why the 
Gettier literature is a doomed project and the covert social nature of knowledge explains why that research project has run for so long; 
and De Brasi (2015b), that shows how it can accommodate and explain the various value desiderata related to knowledge, as well as the 
factivity and transmissibility of knowledge.
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criteria of adequacy, or even that society is the final arbiter 
about knowledge. Not only is the testimonial pra ice subject 
to subjective epistemic evaluations (endorsement), but also 
to objective ones (de facto truth-conduciveness). So not any 
procedure goes and some procedures are better than others. 
The absolutism/relativism dichotomy is false and some sort 
of epistemic pluralism is a sound, legitimate option (see also 
Heckman, 1990, p. 15). Moreover, none of the above rejects 
or is inconsistent with the other (alleged) central tenets of 
traditional epistemology (A, B, D, E and F). 
So, this approach to knowledge is friendly to social and 
feminist epistemologies (it provides them with a framework 
on which their insights blossom and they cannot be dismissed 
as not being “real” or “proper” epistemology, as some seem 
tempted to do) and, importantly, it does not promote an 
“epistemology on holiday” that does not help us progress. 
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